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Abstract
Monistic organizational structure of a Czech join-stock company after recodification of
private law
Traditionally, the only board structure available for national joint-stock companies under
the laws of the Czech Republic was two-tier model based on strict division of corporate
governance functions between two separate boards. With the effect as of January 1st 2014, new
Business Corporations Act no. 90/2012 Coll. (“Act”) has introduced alternative statutory
framework for one-tier board structure for join-stock companies which have its seat in the
Czech Republic and thus are governed by the Czech laws. The Act made it possible for
shareholders to choose between both models of board structures as what they deemed would
fit best the purpose of their business. In this narrow sense the addition may have been looked
at as praiseworthy. However the imperfect implementation of one-tier model of corporate
governance into Czech law has raised serious interpretational issues which may effectively
render this model unacceptable for adoption because the division of powers between the board
of directors and general manager remains unclear.
The main purpose of my thesis is to address this issue by clarifying the scope of powers
which are vested by the law in the board of directors and general manager of the join-stock
company which opts for one-tier board structure. Since there is little experience with this model
of corporate governance in the Czech Republic I had to search for inspiration in foreign
literature. I chose English company law as reference point for my observations. It helped me
to understand some basic elements of one-tier board structure for which England is world-
renowned.
Thus first part of the thesis is focused on short description of doctrinal development in area
of company law because it helps to put the field of corporate governance in the broader
perspective of companies’ regulation. This is followed by brief description of the nature of
British company law mainly in regard to board of directors which illustrates why I put such an
emphasis on interpretation of strong position of the board and its wide powers under the Act.
The chapter number four is the core of the thesis where I deal with aforementioned issue of
division of powers between the board of directors and general manager in particular. By
providing the description of the role which board of directors, as opposed to management board
and supervisory board in traditional two-tier model, should perform, I try to answer the
question of the true nature of the one-tier model as adopted by the Act.
Unfortunately, since the range of potential interpretation of relevant provisions of the Act is
really wide, it is not possible to arrive at final conclusion regarding the nature of one-tier model
of corporate governance in the Czech Republic. In this sense the thesis should be viewed as
contribution to ongoing discussion on concepts of modern domestic regulation of corporations.
